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Abstract:  
 
The article analyses the use of policy tools in the Russian housing sector, associated with 
the government’s objective of development, and examines the pattern of complementarity 
that exists between the policy tools. Building on the insights of historical institutionalist 
and public policy literatures, it argues that the choices of policy tools are determined by 
institutional and policy sector specific structural factors and temporal calculations by the 
policy makers leading them to adopt specific ‘bundles’ of policy instruments as well as 
doubling policy arrangements.  
 
 
 
 
Key words: Russian politics, public policy, tools of government, development, consultative 
authoritarianism 
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Introduction  
Development has been a stated goal of policy in many policy areas in Russia. In his recent 
presidential addresses Vladimir Putin emphasised that the country’s development in terms of 
economic growth, technological modernisation, innovation, and international competitiveness 
represented Russia’s top priority.1 ‘Development’ has been argued to represent the essence of 
Russia’s narrow technical economic modernisation which is preferred by the country’s elites 
over a more comprehensive process involving social and political spheres.2 To promote this 
narrow developmental agenda multiple state corporations, funds, agencies, special territorial 
zones, banks and consultations with business leaders have been utilised by the Russian state in 
various sectors of economy. Much of the research into such ‘institutions of development’ has 
examined the extent to which they in fact promote economic growth in specific areas3 pointing 
to occasional successes4 but more often to failures and limitations. The latter have been argued 
to relate to the political factors, including systemic rent seeking and corruption by elite actors 
and bureaucratic officials5 and the subversive behaviour of regional administrations.6 Another 
strand of analysis has focussed on the protracted and contested decision-making process 
involved in setting up development-oriented policies and structures in different spheres and 
regions.7 Yet another, related, direction of research8 has also engaged with the regional 
dimension of development policies. It put forward a set of structural, ideational (associated with 
ideas and aspirations of individual influential actors such as regional leaders and influential 
experts) and interest-based explanations to account for the variation in pro-growth policies and 
institutions established in Russian regions and broad geographical areas.  
 
The present study speaks to the latter line of analysis. I adopt the framework of ‘tools of 
government’9 – which distinguishes between information-, authority-, finance- and 
organisation-based tools – originating in the public policy literature within political science, to 
                                                          
1 Vladimir Putin, “Poslanie Presidenta Federal’nomy Sobraniyu”, 4 December 2014, 
http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/47173/work (accessed 6 January 2015); Vladimir Putin,  “Poslanie 
Presidenta Federal’nomy Sobraniyu”, 3 December 2015, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/50864 (accessed 4 December 2015). 
2 Vladimir Gel’man, “Why not authoritarian modernisation in Russia?”, in Vladimir Gel’man ed., 
Authoritarian Modernisation in Russia: Ideas, Institutions and Policies (London: Routledge): 1-21. 
3 Richard Connolly, “State Industrial Policy in Russia: the Nanotechnology Industry”, Post-Soviet Affairs 29, 
no. 1 (2013): 1-30; Pekka Sutela, The Political Economy of Putin’s Russia (London: Routledge, 2012). 
4 Lev Freinkman and Alexander Yakovlev, “Institutional Frameworks to Support Regulatory Reform in 
Middle-income Economies: Lessons from Russia’s Recent Experience”, Post-Communist Economies 27, no. 
3 (2015): 354-369. 
5 Vladimir Gel’man, “The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia”, Post-Soviet Affairs 32, 
no. 5 (2016): 455-473; Robert W. Orttung and Sufian Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic Mega-project 
and Russia’s Political Economy”, East European Politics 30, no. 2, (2014): 175-191. 
6 Andrey Starodubtsev, “Bureaucratic Strength and Presidential Inattention: Disempowering Territorial 
Development Instruments in Russia”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 201 (2017): 10-13. 
7 Stephen Fortescue, “Russia’s “Turn to the East”: a Study in Policy Making”, Post-Soviet Affairs 32, no.5 
(2016): 423–454. 
8 T. F. Remington, I. Sobolieva, A. Sobolev, and M. Urnov, “Economic and Social Policy Trade-offs in the 
Russian Regions: Evidence from Four Case Studies”, Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 10, (2013): 1855-1876; 
Susanne A. Wengle, Post-Soviet Power (New York: Cambridge University Press 2015). 
9 Christopher Hood and Helen Margetts, The Tools of Government (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015). 
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examine the multitude of policy instruments applied by the Russian government in one area of 
policy, namely housing, and to consider the rationale for their use. In doing so, the article 
proposes a way to understand the complementarity of policy arrangements used by the Russian 
government in different policy sectors.  
 
‘Tools of government’ literature views policies applied by the state to implement its policy goals 
as a set of constituent elements, termed tools or instruments. The study of the tools of 
government has been one of the most important advances in the field of public policy over last 
four decades.10 This literature argues that tools do not appear by themselves but as a part of a 
mix, which features certain combinations or ‘bundles’ of instruments. The choice of policy tools 
and their combinations is as political as the choice of policy goals and is highly context 
dependent.11 This choice reflects country- and policy sector-specific institutional arrangements 
and structural characteristics.12  
 
Institutional features of the Russian political environment include the authoritarian nature of 
the political regime, with weak formal institutions and strong informal interpersonal ties, an 
over-powered but divided executive, systemic corruption and non-compliance of medium- and 
lower levels of state authority, and generally low levels of civil society activity.13 These 
institutional features are reflected in the mix of developmental policy tools, structuring the 
choice of instruments by policy officials and, as I will show, placing serious limits on Russian 
developmental policies. However, it is also important to highlight the diverse motivations of the 
federal government officials who are responsible for the policy design at the federal level. Some 
of these actors are driven by the rent-seeking motives, yet other officials at the ministries and 
experts at adjacent non-governmental policy think-tanks are driven by policy ideas and 
demonstrate commitment to polity improvement.14 Many of such actors also participate in 
international policy communities which facilitate the diffusion of policy-relevant new 
knowledge and public administration techniques.15 In addition, for policy, just as for politics, 
time is an important factor. Policy-making is not an instantaneous exercise. It is often a 
                                                          
10 Peter John, “All Tools are Informational Now: How Information and Persuasion Define the Tools of 
Government”, Policy and Politics, 41, no. 4 (2013): 605-620, at 605. 
11 B. Guy Peters, “Is governance for everybody?”, Policy and Society 33 (2014): 301-306. 
12 Michael Howlett, “Managing the ‘Hollow State’: Procedural Policy Instruments and Modern 
Governance”, Canadian Public Administration 43, no. 4 (2000): 412-431. 
13 Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015); Alfred B. 
Evans, “Protests and Civil Society in Russia: the Struggle for the Khimki Forest”, Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 45, no. 3-4 (2012): 233-242; Gel’man, The Vicious Circle; Vadim Kononenko and 
Arkady Moshes eds., Russia As A Network State: What Works In Russia When State Institutions Do Not? 
(Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Alyona Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, 
Power Networks and Informal Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
14 Anna A. Dekalchuk, “Choosing Between Bureaucracy and the Reformers: The Russian Pension Reform 
of 2001 as a Compromise Squared”, in Gel’man ed., Authoritarian Modernization in Russia: 166-182; 
Freinkman and Yakovlev, “Institutional Frameworks”; Marina Khmelnitskaya, The Policy-Making Process 
and Social Learning in Russia: the Case of Housing Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).   
15 Khmelnitskaya, The Policy-Making Process; Meri Kulmala, Michael Rasell and Zhanna Chernova, 
“Overhauling Russia’s Child Welfare System: Institutional and Ideational Factors Behind the Paradigm 
Shift”, The Journal of Social Policy Studies 15, no. 3 (2017, in print). 
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piecemeal process involving many successive rounds of policy change, which take place against 
the background of economic, political and social transformations. Literature on tools of 
government, following insights of the historical institutionalist scholarship16 argues that policy-
makers can in fact purposefully use those temporal processes to promote implementation of 
their desired goals over time.17  
 
The paper develops the following arguments. It argues that we can think of the ‘institutions of 
development’ in Russia as a part of a broader mix of policy tools present in a given area of 
policy. This tool mix reflects institutional features of the political system, particularly as will be 
demonstrated in the paper the non-compliance of the regional and local government officials, 
and the structure of the relevant policy community. I argue, first, that these characteristics 
necessitate a specific complementary arrangements of policy tools within the policy mix. I show 
that within the mix we can identify specific ‘bundles’ of tools, in which state organisational- and 
authority-based tools reinforce the use of softer types of financial and informational 
instruments. [Three types of bundles are identified: treasure-organisation bundle, treasure-
authority bundle and nodality-authority bundle. Examples of the former type in the housing 
sphere are the state agency and state funds; of the second – state-controlled banks; of the third - 
business associations and different forms of consultations between the state and professional 
community, including representatives of the business and housing experts, promoted by the 
state.]CAN BE DELETED IF TOO LONG Such combinations help to counter the disincentives to 
the middle and lower levels of state bureaucracy to participation in the state agenda of 
development. Second, keeping in mind the noted above temporal dimension of policy-making, I 
demonstrate that the non-compliance of regional and local officials paired with weak 
development of the civil society institutions lead policy makers to create ‘doubling’ policy 
arrangements. That is, providing two alternative instruments to achieve similar outcomes: one 
involving a high degree of administrative intervention – and allowing ample rent-seeking 
opportunities – while another alternative arrangement relies on active participation of non-
governmental societal actors in policy implementation, and can be seen as an alternative set of 
instruments for more democratic times.  
 
This paper places its analysis within the housing sphere, a socially significant and multifaceted 
sector of the Russian economy and social policy. The development agenda in housing, according 
to the official documents, goes beyond building sufficient amount of ‘square meters’ per every 
Russian citizen but lies in the aspirational objective of ‘providing [them with] the high quality of 
life broadly defined’.18 My concern in this study, however, is with the choice of the policy 
instruments through which policy goals are implemented, rather than with the setting of 
                                                          
16 James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change”, in James Mahoney 
and Kathleen Thelen eds., Explaining Institutional Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2010): 1-37. 
17 Michael Howlett and Jeremy Rayner, “Patching vs Packaging in Policy Formulation: Assessing Policy 
Portfolio Design”, Politics and Governance 1, no. 2 (2013): 170-182. 
18 Pravitel’strvo Rossii, “Gosudarstvennaya Programma Rossiyskoy Federatsii ‘Obespechenie Dostupnym i 
Komfortnym Zhil’yem i Kommunal’nymi Uslugami Grazhdan Rossiyskoy Federatsii’”, 15 April 2014, 
http://www.minstroyrf.ru/trades/realizaciya-gosudarstvennyh-programm/29/ (accessed March 2015). 
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strategic priorities for development19 in this area. Yet, I do not trace the bureaucratic tag-of-war 
(as done by Fortescue and Remington for example)20 related to the adoption of specific 
instruments in concrete situations. Instead, I survey the patterns of policy instruments found in 
the housing sphere and explain the logic of their use with the reference to Russian institutional 
environment and the specific features of the housing policy setting and community. Also, the 
focus is on the official structures and their combinations, rather than unofficial processes such 
as inter-personal networks and corruption. This is a conscious decision, made in order to 
illuminate the effects of the institutional context over policy choices. Nonetheless, the influence 
of these informal processes on the official structures is highlighted throughout the study. Time-
wise, the focus is on the period between 2005 and the start of 2015, yet some important policy 
instruments introduced earlier are addressed as well. The paper uses diverse documentary 
sources for its analysis: Russian legislation, reports of relevant state agencies, as well as 
publications and reports of NGOs and think tanks working in the housing sphere, thorough 
reading of Russian general press and specialised housing publications. 
 
After this introduction, the article turns to the Russian studies literature on the ‘institutions of 
development’ and on policy-making, proposing to consider ideational and temporal dimensions 
of the policy-makers’ strategies involved in policy design. After that I introduce the ‘tools of 
government’ concept.  Following on from this the case of housing is explored by, first, surveying 
policy instruments used in this sphere and then explaining their choices. The conclusion 
summarizes the argument and comments on the complementarity effects associated with the 
mix of policy tools in the Russian context. 
 
 
‘Institutions of Development’ and policy-making in Russia 
How does the Russian government go about implementing its strategy of development? The 
answer can be found in an intriguing mix of purpose built state structures, a certain degree of 
government business cooperation and the tactical use of state finance. 
 
Connolly’s study of Russian industrial policy in the sphere of nano-technology21 demonstrates 
how the government approach has relied on a combination of the state corporation Rosnano and 
ample budget funding. He also points to the limitations of the Russian approach to development 
in this area associated with the lack of wider societal involvement, including industry and civil 
society. A similar combination of plentiful finance provided by the budget and state banks 
                                                          
19 On strategic planning see Andrew Monaghan, “Putin’s Russia: Shaping a ‘Grand Strategy’?”, 
International Affairs 89, no. 5 (2013): 1221–1236. 
20 Fortescue, “Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’”; Thomas Remington, “Pension Reform in Authoritarian Regimes: 
Russia and China Compared” (2015), https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Pension-Reform-in-
Authoritarian-Regimes-Russia-and-Remington/af163f68c90759c32c9942e843bc8eb865e7cfc5 , 
(accessed September 2016). 
21 Connolly, “State Industrial Policy in Russia”. 
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(Gazprom and VEB), and a state corporation, Olympstroy, were used for the preparation of the 
Sochi region for the 2014 winter Olympics.22 A greater variety of policy elements is referred to 
in the study of the Russian Far East development.23 Among the measures mentioned are direct 
budget funding, dedicated developmental funds, the state development bank VEB, private 
investments leveraged by the state, special economic zones, the involvement of specialised 
organisational structures such as the Agency for Strategic Initiatives (ASI) and certain business 
associations in addition to a task-formed government ministry. Many of these structures, state 
corporations and state funds specifically, have attracted much criticism for corruption, made 
possible by their special legal status and resultant opaque structure that precludes public 
accountability.24 With regard to financing development, Vernikov25 and Aslund26 argue that 
Russian state-owned banks dominate the country’s financial system27 and are employed by the 
state to implement strategically important projects. With regard to the public-private 
cooperation, the nature of state-business relations in Russia has attracted divergent 
interpretations. Hanson and Teague28 argue that the Russian state exercises greater pressure on 
big business compared to historical cases of other middle-income emerging economies. In a 
later contribution, Hanson29 argues that connections between officials and businessmen 
predominantly serve the purposes of personal enrichment and continuation in office rather 
than form a coherent policy of industrial development.  
 
Yet, other research underlines the importance of compromises and exchanges between the 
Russian state and large business entities in reaching institutional arrangements conducive to 
development in specific areas of policy, such as electricity generation,30 social31 and fiscal.32 In 
fact, it has been argued that the choice and specific configuration of policies is determined in the 
process of bureaucratic competition among the alliances of different parts of Russia’s executive, 
regional leaders and their non-state partners from business, think-tanks and social NGOs. 
                                                          
22 Orttung and Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic Mega-project”.  
23 Fortescue, “Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’”. 
24 Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy; Gel’man, “The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism”; Orttung 
and Zhemukhov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympic Mega-project”. 
25 Andrey Vernikov, “The Impact of State-controlled Banks on the Russian Banking Sector”, Eurasian 
Geography and Economics 53, no. 2 (2012): 250-266. 
26 Andres Aslund, “The Enigmatic Russian Banking System: an Introduction”, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics 53, No. 2 (2012): 244-249.  
27 Marina Khmelnitskaya, “Russian Housing Finance Policy: State-led Institutional Evolution”, Post-
Communist Economies 26, no. 2 (2014): 149-175.  
28 Philip Hanson and Elisabeth Teague, “Big Business and the State in Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies 57, no. 
5, (2005): 657-680. 
29 Philip Hanson, “Networks, Cronies and Business Plans: Business-State Relations in Russia”, in 
Kononenko and Moshes eds., Russia As a Network State: 113-138.  
30 Wengle, Post-Soviet Power. 
31 Linda J. Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States: Reform Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007); Meri Kulmala, Markus Kainu, Jouko Nikula and Markku Kivinen, 
“Paradoxes of Agency: Democracy and Welfare in Russia”, Demokratizatsiya 22, no. 4 (2014): 523-552; 
Thomas Remington, The Politics of Inequality in Russia, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011); 
Remington et al., “Economic and Social Policy Trade-offs”. 
32 Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal, “Contra Coercion: Russian Tax Reform, Exogenous Shocks, and 
Negotiated Institutional Change’, American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (2004): 139–152.  
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President Putin often credited with having a key role in policy-making33 setting the general 
policy direction and often refraining to spend his political capital on getting too involved, but 
then eventually having to come down on the side of one of the factions in the policy battle. The 
analysis in the present paper about the choice of developmental tools in the housing sector 
follows this broad tradition but invites to problematize the temporal dimension of policy-
making and consider strategies of federal policy-makers who are working within the constraints 
of the institutional and policy-specific environment.  
 
As the top country’s leadership, policy-makers involved in policy design at the level of individual 
ministries and presidential administration are driven by their policy ideas, as well as the need 
to remain in office. Freinkman and Yakovlev34 for instance describe a coalition of officials and 
representatives of business medium-sized businesses, which included an influential presidential 
advisor Andrey Belousov, the Association Delovaya Rossia and ASI Agency, and many other 
business and expert organizations, all driven by ideas of regulatory reforms and the 
improvement of Russia’s business climate. Much has also been written about the influence of 
the ‘Gref team’ on the reforms during Vladimir Putin’s first presidential terms.35  
 
An important concern for like-minded policy makers is that they need to design policy tools 
capable of delivering their policies at the level of Russian regions and municipalities. Regional 
and local leaders at the same time show a varied attitude to the objectives of economic and 
social development.36 In the housing sphere, specifically, regional and particularly local 
authorities play the key role.37 Moreover, the lion share of budget spending on housing is 
concentrated at the regional and local levels, 49 and 43 percent respectively.38 Yet, it is the 
federal policy makers who elaborate the basic directions for policy and policy programmes, 
dedicated funding for which is leveraged from regional and local budgets.39 Their policy 
instruments, therefore, have to reach the local level over the heads of the regional and local 
administrations, while also providing them with an incentive to participate in the 
developmental agenda defined by the federal government. To this may be added Russia’s 
shifting attitudinal and general political context. Russia has had a pendulum-like pattern of 
political development whereby a democratic opening was followed by an authoritarian 
backsliding. At the same time, the civil society – generally regarded as underdeveloped – has 
recently shown tendencies towards maturing.40 Against this background, much of the policy 
ideas held by the policy makers have derived from the international policy practice and rely on 
                                                          
33 For discussion, see: Fortescue, “Russia’s “Turn to the East’”. 
34 Freinkman and Yakovlev, “Institutional Frameworks”. 
35 Cook, Postcommunist Welfare States; Starodubtsev, “Bureaucratic Strength”; Sutela, The Political 
Economy of Putin’s Russia.   
36 Remington et al., “Economic and Social Policy Trade-offs”.  
37 Elena Shomina and Frances Heywood, “Transformation in Russian Housing: the New Key Roles of Local 
Authorities”, International Journal of Housing Policy 13, no. 3 (2013): 312-324. 
38 Sutela, The Political Economy of Putin’s Russia: 200; also see: Marina Khmelnitskaya, “The Social Budget 
Policy Process in Russia at a Time of Crisis”, Post-Communist Economies 29, no. 4 (2017 forthcoming). 
39 For instance: Pravitel’strvo Rossii, “Gosudarstvennaya Programma”. 
40 Elena Chebankova, Civil Society in Putin’s Russia (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); Evans, “Protests and Civil 
Society in Russia”; Kulmala et al., “Paradoxes of Agency”: 535-536.  
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modern pattern of civic activism and supervision over service provision as well as well-
functioning system of state administration. The use of doubling policy arrangements, to which 
the analysis in the next sections points, demonstrates that Russian policy makers aim to 
purposefully use the temporal mechanism of policy evolution to achieve desired policy 
outcomes over time.  
 
In this paper, I propose to view the pattern of compatibility of policy instruments adopted by 
Russian policy makers, to fit the institutional and sector-specific context, taking such temporal 
and ideational dimension of instrument choices into account.  
  
 
What are policy tools? 
Policy instruments can be thought of as the ’myriad techniques at the disposal of governments 
to implement their policy objectives’.41 Scholars have worked on arranging this multitude of 
tools into a more manageable analytical set.42 A simple four-type categorisation was proposed 
by Christopher Hood43 that divided all government instruments for steering policy into four 
distinct categories - nodality, authority, treasure and organisation.44 ‘In simple terms it could be 
said that nodality works on your knowledge and attitudes, authority on your rights, status and 
duties, treasure on your bank balance, and organisation on your physical environment or even 
on your person’.45  
 
More recent research has termed the tools covered in Hood’s framework as ’substantive’. These 
are instruments that ‘directly affect the production and delivery of goods and services in 
society’.46 Yet, by focussing solely on the substantive tools, we may overlook a whole different 
category of government tools, namely ‘procedural’ instruments. The latter include, for instance, 
public reviews, commissions and committees, conferences, research funding, and focus groups. 
Procedural tools are applied by the states in order to steer the policy process itself. Similar to 
substantive tools, they can also be classified according to Hood’s four basic government 
resources. The use of a generic classification of tools is attractive because it allows comparison 
of governmental activity across countries, over time and within governments.47 In addition, the 
institutional and technological neutrality of this approach is particularly relevant in the context 
                                                          
41 Michael Howlett (1991): 2, Cited in John, “All Tools are Informational Now” : 605. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Hood and Margetts, The Tools of Government. 
44 The categorisation further divides each of the four resources according to the end that they are applied 
to achieve into two broad sub-types: detectors to observe or obtain information about the world/society 
and effectors to produce specific kinds of behaviour. It is also useful to point out that government tools 
introduce different level of constraint into the social world: very roughly the constraint would rise from 
nodality to treasure to authority and finally organisation. 
45 Ibid: 7. 
46 Howlett, “Managing the ‘Hollow State’”: 414. 
47 Hood and Margetts, The Tools of Government: 20. 
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of my analysis which aims to describe and understand the use of tools associated with the 
Russian government developmental agenda.  
 
Once tools are categorised, a further question about the rationale for their selection can also be 
raised. It is argued that the choice is influenced by two interlinked variables: state capacity to 
affect diverse actors and the complexity of the community of diverse actors involved in a given 
policy field, or a policy sub-system.48 With regard to the choice of substantive tools, a softer 
approach relying on the use of treasure will be applied by the government in cases when the 
sub-system is complex and government capacity is high. Nodality and authority-based tools are 
preferred when social actors’ composition is complex but state capacity is wanting. In the third 
scenario - low sub-system complexity vs. high state capacity - the state possessing a 
considerable capacity would have to step in through the use of direct organisation to substitute 
for the sub-system underdevelopment.49 In case of procedural tools, their selection is also 
associated with the organisation of the policy sub-system, and the extent to which the 
government wishes to intervene in and manipulate this community of policy actors. Thus, it will 
move on from softer instruments of nodality and treasure (information provision, education, 
focus groups; and funding research respectively) to more vexing tools of authority (treaties and 
political agreements; or setting up advisory groups, for instance) and organisation (institutional 
reforms, judicial reviews, conferences organised by the government and interest group 
creation).  
 
While this framework of substantive and procedural instrument choices might be criticised for 
being abstract and not engaging enough with the background of individual decisions related to 
the selection of specific instruments in concrete situations, nonetheless it is useful because it 
outlines how general patterns of instrumental choices can be determined and explained.  We 
therefore can imagine a certain tool ‘mix’ applied by the government in specific circumstances 
and for particular tasks. We may look for such a mix in the Russian situation and examine how 
and why specific forms are used.  
 
 
Tools of government in the Russian housing sphere: substantive and procedural types50 
Development of the housing sphere has been a long-standing and key priority for the Russian 
authorities. The attention to this area is not surprising given that since the Soviet period the 
’housing question’ has represented one of the central points of public grievance. Post-Soviet 
                                                          
48 Howlett, “Managing the ‘Hollow State’”. 
49 In the fourth case scenario the low state capacity would be facing an underdeveloped sub-system 
leaving the public to effectively provide for itself, as in the case of the provision of welfare in traditional 
societies.    
50 Some passages in this section were previously published in Public Administration Issues (Journal of the 
National Research University Higher School of Economics), no. 5 (2014): 96-111, 
http://vgmu.hse.ru/en/2014--5.html (accessed June 2017). 
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Russia had to deal with this shortage.51 The objectives of housing development - in terms of new 
housing construction, greater affordability of home purchases, increasing scale of mortgage 
lending, housing renovation, and the development of housing rentals - have been stated in 
various policy documents. The government strategy in this area was outlined in one of Vladimir 
Putin’s ‘May’ decrees signed in 2012.52 The details of its broad initiatives were spelt out in the 
version of the government programme ‘Provision of affordable and comfortable housing’ from 
April 2014.53  
 
Beyond policy statements, two state Funds54 and the Agency for Home Mortgage Lending 
(AHML), in addition to the Ministry for Construction and Communal Services55 (Minstroy RF) 
currently operated in the housing sphere in early 2015.56 Beside these, Russian banks, such as 
Bank Moskvy, were involved in funding and coordinating local municipal infrastructural 
projects.57 Further, state-controlled banks, Sberbank, VTB and Gazprombank have provided 
funding to the housing sphere via their extensive mortgage lending schemes. In addition, from 
the early 2010s certain “softer” measures, involving civil society groups and expert community 
can be noted. The launch of an annual international professional forum in urban development 
(Moscow Urban Forum), citizens’ focus groups and on-line consultations related to housing and 
urban development organised over recent years serve as examples of this trend. Some numeric 
indicators of Russian housing performance are offered in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Russian housing and mortgage market development, 2005-2014 ABOUT HERE 
 
Below I survey the use of government tools in the housing sphere moving from the substantive 
to the procedural type. I show that within the Russian development project tools tend to come 
in ‘bundles’, with organization and authority being the underlying tools used in combination 
with treasure and nodality. The second part of the section, following the hypothesis provided by 
the comparative literature, demonstrates that the overall instrument mix, as well as the bundles 
of tools within it, are determined by the complex milieu of political, social and economic actors 
                                                          
51 Alexandra Burdyak, “Ipoteka v Rossii: Potrebnosti, Vozmozhnosti i Namereniya Naseleniya”, Finansy i 
Biznes, no. 2 (2012): 76-92; Khmelnitskaya, The Policy-making Process; Jane Zavisca, Housing the New 
Russia (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2012). 
52 Prezident Rossii, “O merakh po obespecheniyu grazhdan Rossiyskoy Federatsii dostupnym i 
komfortnym zhil’em i povysheniyu kachestva zhilishchno-kommunal’nykh uslug”, Ukaz N 600, 7 May 
2012. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 9 May 2012, http://www.rg.ru/2012/05/09/zhilje-dok.html (accessed 18 
September 2012).  
53 Pravitel’stvo Rossii, “Gosudarstvennaya Programma”. This programme adopted on 15 April 2014 is an 
updated version of the programme adopted in November 2012. 
54 The foundation for the development of residential construction (Fond RZhS) and the Foundation for the 
promotion of the reform of housing and utility services (Fond HUS) were formed in the 2007-2008 period. 
55 HUS stands for Housing and Utility services (ZhKKh, zhilishchnoe i kommunal’noe khoziaystvo). 
56 See the Ministry website with the links to the above state funds and the AHML at 
http://www.minstroyrf.ru/ (accessed March 2015). 
57 Uchastie banka Moskvy v infrastructurnom stroitel’stve, Kommersant, 11 November 2013, available at 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2340804 (accessed June 2017). 
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involved in housing and whose relations are governed by the Russian political institutional 
structure.  
 
 Substantive tools 
Policy instruments comprising the policy mix in the sphere of housing development have been 
put in place over years and some appeared as early as the mid-1990s. At the time, the 
government reformers’ objectives were framed in terms of the ‘market reform’ of housing - as a 
part of the country’s wider economic and welfare state liberalization - rather than in terms of 
‘development’. Nonetheless, one of the central developmental tools of contemporary Russian 
housing policy, with the primary functions of treasure and nodality combined with that of 
organisation, is represented by the Agency for the Home Mortgage Lending (AHML) formed in 
the mid-1990s.  
 
The Agency, set up in 1996, copied an American analogous structure.58 AHML (www.ahml.ru) 
acts as an industry regulator and provides state funding to augment financial resources directed 
towards mortgage lending by the banks (see Table 1).59 AHML funded around seven percent of 
the market.60 If during the 1990s and 2000s, the Agency worked to kick start the Russian 
mortgage market per se, over the recent decade its activities became more nuanced. It turned 
towards providing mortgages for socially vulnerable categories, development of municipal 
infrastructure, new housing construction and housing rentals.  
 
Funding seven percent of the mortgage market the AHML does not stand alone among the 
government treasure-based tools. Russian state-owned banks, such as Sberbank, Gazprombank 
and VTB, represent the other channel through which the state extends housing credit to Russian 
families. State-controlled banks are the largest mortgage lenders in the country,61 with a market 
share of 82 percent.62 Sberbank, for instance, apart from providing commercial mortgages also 
provides, with support from the AHML, subsidised mortgages to several categories deemed as 
socially vulnerable. These include families with three and more children, young families, young 
                                                          
58 Raymond Struyk R and Nadezhda Kosareva, “Natasha Mae: First Secondary Facility in the Former 
Soviet Bloc, Housing Finance International 13, no. 3 (1999): 29-36.  
59 Khmelnitskaya, “Russian housing finance policy”. 
60 AIZhK, Informatzionno-statisticheskaya systema (2013), 
http://www.ahml.ru/ru/agency/analytics/statsis/, accessed 22 June 2013. 
61 Since summer 2014 several of Russia’s largest state banks, which include Sberbank and Gazprombank, 
were placed under economic sanctions, nonetheless their participation in housing programmes has 
continued. See: Richard Connolly, “Western Economic Sanctions and Russia’s Place in the Global 
Economy, in Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Richard Sakwa eds., Ukraine and Russia: People, Politics, 
Propaganda and Perspectives (Bristol: E-International Relations, 2015), http://www.e-ir.info/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Ukraine-and-Russia-E-IR.pdf (accessed September 2015): 223-232, at 224.  
62 Alexander Semeniaka, Rol’ gosudarstvennykh institutov razvitiya v sozdanii novykh rynkov (na primere 
ipoteki), Paper presented at the conference “Ekspertnoe sodeystvie socialno-ekonomicheskomu razvitiyu 
gorodov”, Moscow, 4 June 2015, http://www.urbaneconomics.ru/news/?mat_id=1815 (accessed 13 
January 2016). 
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scientists, teachers, military personnel and mothers when they have second or further children 
– the latter support wonderfully named the ‘maternity capital’.63 In addition, Bank Moskvy a 
subsidiary of VTB has funded local infrastructure development projects. State-controlled banks 
are managed as commercial entities. Therefore, it would be incorrect to view them as a form of 
government ‘organization’. Yet, their role as treasure-based instruments can hardly be 
overestimated. Moreover, the state has used its authority, to ‘appoint’ specific banks as vehicles 
for housing finance. I would argue that this arrangement involving state banks therefore 
represents an important ‘bundle’ of treasure and authority. 
 
A greater level of government organisation marked the work of two state funds: the Fund for 
the Development of Housing Construction (Fond RZhS) and the Fund for the Reform of Housing 
and Utility Services (Fond ZhKKh). The two structures were originally set up in 2007-2008. The 
task of the first of the foundations, Fond RZhS (www.fondrgs.ru, assessed April 2015) lied in the 
integrated development of territories and their subsequent transfer for the purposes of housing 
construction. The foundation identified available land plots in often heavy-built up urban areas 
and having fast-tracked all the necessary administrative procedures handed them over to 
private construction companies using the auctioning mechanism. The emphasis was on the 
construction of ‘affordable’ or budget housing and low-rise construction projects. In 2014, the 
Fund according to its own reporting converted into housing construction 45 percent of all land 
plots that had been involved in housing development in the country during that year. Its 
activities span 76 of Russia’s regions.64 The organisational tool that this structure represented 
was aimed at reconciling the divergent interests of regional and local authorities and those of 
private property developers with the objectives defined by the Federal government, Minstroy 
and the AHML in the area that is deemed as important for the state.  
 
The purpose of the second of the funds, the state corporation Fond ZhKKh (www.fondgkh.ru, 
accessed June 2017), was similar but related to the provision of organisational and financial 
resources combined for the renovation of dilapidated local housing and utilities infrastructure. 
                                                          
63 The “maternity capital” initiative can be interpreted as an important part of the new family policy of the 
Russian state that is facilitated through housing policy as well as health policy. See: Kulmala et al., 
“Paradoxes of Agency”: 535-536. Yet, maternity capital also represents an important element of housing 
policy as such. Its aim is to develop mortgage funding as a way for improving housing conditions of 
Russian families (see Zavisca, Housing the New Russia) and has to be considered as one among many 
initiatives serving the single purpose of transferring housing responsibilities from the state to individual 
households. See: Khmelnitskaya, The Policy-Making Process. Maternity capital initiative then represents a 
case of ‘convergence’ between two institutional arenas: housing and family policies in this case, discussed 
by Orren and Skowronek. See: Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, The Search for American Political 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). It also can be interpreted as an attempt at 
‘policy integration’, a process that aims to devise policies that avoid treating interrelated issues, such as 
birth rates and housing overcrowding, in isolation from one another. See: Jeremy Rayner and Michael 
Howlett, “Introduction: Understanding Integrated Policy Strategies and Their Evolution”, Policy and 
Society 28, no. 2 (2009): 99-109. 
64 2014 Annual report, Popechitel’skiy sovet utverdil godovoy otchet fonda za 2014 god, 22 April 2015, 
available at http://www.fondrgs.ru/press/news_detail.php?ID=38411 and ‘RZhS Fund in Numbers’, Fond 
RZhS: Tsifry i Facti, 27 April 2015, available at http://www.fondrgs.ru/files/docs/27.04.2015.pdf (both 
accessed April 2015).  
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During 2014 and early 2015 the Fund reported that around 200 thousand citizens were re-
housed from sub-standard buildings as a result of its work.65 As its sister structure, the Fund for 
housing renovations sought to bring together the interests of the regional and local authorities 
and private contractors of renovation works to ensure the realisation of policy goals set by the 
federal authorities. The approach that is close to that of ASI agency described in Freinkman and 
Yakovlev.66  
 
Seen as temporary at the time of establishment, the activities of the Fund for housing 
renovations continued in 2015. Yet, the government turned to authority-based tools in 
regulating housing renovation in the long run with the law on ‘Capital (major) housing repairs’ 
passed in December 2012.67 The law has obliged residents of private apartments in multi-family 
residential blocks to make monthly savings for the repairs of their apartment buildings. The law 
has specified the mechanisms for the administration of the accumulated savings – either by the 
organisations set up by the owners themselves or by the specially formed Regional Funds for 
Major Repairs run by the regional authorities.68 However, given that just seven percent of 
apartment owners have followed the self-management option (ibid), the function of major 
housing repairs had effectively fallen under control of regional administrations and the Funds 
for Major Repairs run by them. Thus, this arrangement, involving the regional funds of major 
repairs, while not using state funding, nevertheless, has relied on state organisation.  
 
Finally, in terms of nodality-, or information-based tools that are applied by government to 
change behaviour or deliver public goods, these can generally be divided into those aimed at the 
public at large and those related to the housing industry and expert community.  
 
Already in the 1990s, the government aimed to use its information resources to increase public 
awareness of the process and the benefits of the housing reform.69 The National Priority Project 
in Housing launched in 2006 while being a repackaged version of earlier reform initiatives70 
vigorously pronounced the government’s intentions to increase housing affordability via the 
radical and far-reaching spread of mortgage borrowing. Currently, information about mortgage 
finance is widely available in mass media and in the persuasive way in which banks advertise 
                                                          
65 For more figures on the Fund’s operations see http://fondgkh.ru/rezultatyi-rabotyi/informatsiya-ob-
odobrennyih-i-rassmatrivaemyih-zayavkah-na-poluchenie-finansovoy-podderzhki-za-schet-sredstv-
fonda/ (accessed June 2017).  
66 Freinkman and Yakovlev, “Institutional Frameworks”. 
67 Federal’niy Zakon N. 271-FZ (‘Zakon o Kapremonte’), “O vnesenii izmeneniy v Zhilishchniy Kodeks 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii i otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty”, 25 December 2012. Sobranie Zakonodatel’stva 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii, no. 53 (2012, Part 1): st. 7596. 
68 Nadezhda Zabelina, “Mnogie Rossiyane ignoriruiut sbory na kapital’niy remont”, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 
09 November 2015, http://www.ng.ru/economics/2015-11-09/4_kapremont.html (accessed 11 
December 2015).  
69 Institut Ekonomiki Goroda, “Konsteptsia Teleproekta ‘Svoi Dom’, Napravlennogo na Informatsionno-
Propagandistskoe Obespechenie Reformy Zhilishchno-Kommunal’nogo Khoziaystva RF” (Moscow: IUE, 
1997, IUE Archive). 
70 Khmelnitskaya, The Policy-making Process: 113 and 196. 
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their mortgage lending schemes. Such government initiatives as Maternity Capital in addition to 
its other functions in terms of demography and welfare, have also popularised the idea of 
mortgage borrowing as a way of improving housing conditions for families. There certainly has 
been an attitude change in this regard. A survey by the World Bank conducted in the early 
2000s found that most of the respondents knew little about mortgage borrowing.71 This 
situation has certainly changed over the years. By 2014 a quarter of all home purchases were 
made with the use of mortgage credit.72  
 
In addition, the two state funds in housing provided an informational component as well.  Their 
work, particularly in the area of housing repairs, was widely discussed by the state media73 and 
often viewed in a positive light by the members of the public (Sorokina 2010). This contributed 
to a favourable assessment of the government’s work74 in what is perceived by the Russians as a 
troubling policy sphere. To illustrate the level of citizens’ anxiety related to housing, we can 
refer to opinion poll data according to which increases of housing utility tariffs were among the 
top three most important issues that concerned the Russian public during 2012 and 2013. 
These were overtaken by geopolitical concerns in 2014 but gained salience again in 2015 as 
housing charges began to edge up.75  
 
Finally, the reliance on information resources - for ‘effecting’ change and for ‘detecting’ change 
in society and gaining access to valuable information needed in the process of policy-making - is 
evident in several isolated cases concerning the organisation of direct consultations with the 
public on issues related to housing and urban development. Here initiatives of the government 
of Moscow can be noted. For instance, www.moscowidea.ru (accessed June 2017) conducted a 
survey of citizens’ suggestions on the issues of the city’s development (also see 
https://urban.hse.ru/news/community/ accessed June 2017). Another informative example 
concerns the discussion that unfolded around the competition for the best project for the 
development of the Moscow agglomeration during 2012-2013 (see for instance: 
http://irsup.hse.ru/news/60319015.html accessed June 2017). All of these, while involving 
non-governmental organisations, have been organised with the direct encouragement and 
participation of federal and regional state structures, housing ministry Minstroy and the 
Moscow city administration, as well as other development structures, for instance Bank Moskvy. 
The latter as noted has expertise on the issues of housing and urban development. 
 
                                                          
71 World Bank, Developing Residential mortgage markets in the Russian Federation (2003), 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/RUSSIANFEDERATIONEXTN/0,,c
ontentMDK:20531571~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:305600,00.html (accessed 21 
September 2009): 5. 
72 AIZhK, Strategia Razvitiya Gruppy Kompaniy AIZhK 2014-2018 (2014), 
http://www.ahml.ru/common/img/uploaded/files/agency/Strategii_razvitiya_GK_AIZHK_2014.pdf, 
(accessed April 2015): 8.  
73 See http://media.fondgkh.ru/, accessed June 2017. 
74 Opinion polls showed an improvement in public perception of the government’s work in the 2008-10 
period after the funds were established. See:  http://www.levada.ru/en/ratings/  (accessed June 2017). 
75 Levada-Tsentr, Obshchestvennoe Mnenie 2014 (Moskva: Levada Tsentr, 2015): 9. 
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Despite these isolated cases of state-society consultations, it can be said that the government 
appeared to be more effective in beaming information at the public using its nodality, rather 
than using its ‘nodal detectors’ for collecting information from this broad societal audience. And 
yet, Russian housing legislation includes institutional forms that can be used as tools of state-
society dialogue and as a means of engaging local communities in matters of territorial 
development. Foremost among these structures are the associations of home owners, or HOAs. 
 
The government reformers throughout the 1990s and 2000s have sought to develop this 
instrument as a way to organise home-owners’ control over their multi-family blocks of flats. 
Yet, so far it has largely failed to become such due to the resistance from the local and regional 
authorities. By 2007 President Putin in his state of nation address lamented that only seven 
percent of the country’s housing had formed into HOAs.76 In the late 2000s the federal 
government sought to increase HOAs numbers by charging the very local administrations which 
oppose any kind of public control over them, to encourage the home-owners’ self-organisation. 
In doing so, the government essentially hoped to rely on local and regional governments as its 
organisation tool. After this push, by 2014 around 20 percent of apartment blocks in the country 
had become organised in HOAs.77 Many of them, however, operated poorly and were vulnerable 
to capture by the local maintenance companies. Problems with HOA organisation may relate to 
the low levels of trust and the underdevelopment of civil society in Russia78 or to the lack of 
‘technical civic competence’ as Borisova et al. show.79 Yet, there were institutional barriers to 
the HOA organisation80 and the interests of local authorities were key to maintaining those 
barriers. These actors were interested in controlling financial flows in this area ‘which are 
continuous and very large’.81 As a result, it was suggested that the Law on Major Repairs has 
disadvantaged HOAs.82 As regional and local bureaucracies remained keen on managing monies 
collected for repairs themselves - in the form of Regional Funds for Housing Repairs mentioned 
earlier – they were likely to discriminate against self-managed buildings in scheduling 
renovation works, while deterring other apartment owners in other blocks of flats from 
organising. HOAs therefore represented those “would-be-tools” of state-social cooperation, or 
nodality, essential for development in the housing sphere, which remained unavailable to the 
federal government due to local administrative resistance.  
 
                                                          
76 Vladimir Putin, Poslanie Prezidenta Federal’nomu Sobraniyu, 26 April 2007, available at 
http://www.polit.ru./dossie/2007/04/26poslaniye.html (accessed 23 September 2009). 
77 Ekaterina Borisova, Leonid Polishchuk and Anatoly Peresetsky, “Collective Management of Residential 
Housing in Russia: the Importance of Being Social”, Journal of Comparative Economics 42, no. 3 (2014): 
609-629. 
78 Evans, “Protests and Civil Society in Russia”.  
79 Borisova et al., “Collective Management”. 
80 Rosa Vihavainen, Homeowners’ Associations in Russia after the 2005 Housing Reform (Helsinki: Kikimora 
Publications, 2009).  
81 Shomina and Heywood, “Transformation in Russian Housing”, 320. 
82 Elena Vladimirova, “Pochemu deputat Khovanskaya nazyvaet fond kapremonta piramidoy”, 
Stroitel’stvo.ru, 27 May 2015, http://rcmm.ru/zhkh/22479-pochemu-deputat-hovanskaya-nazyvaet-
fond-kapremonta-piramidoy.html (accessed 11 December 2015). 
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By contrast to the meagre results with public organisation, the government appeared more 
effective in establishing two-way communication with professional communities involved in the 
housing area. Among nodality-based instruments aimed at the professionals several annual 
events organised for entrepreneurs, experts, academics and investors can be noted. Examples 
include the Russian Investment and Construction Forum (www.ribf.ru accessed March 2015), 
the Forum for Housing and Utility Services 2015,83 and the annual international Moscow Urban 
Forum (http://mosurbanforum.ru/ accessed June 2017), with an associated series of regional 
urban development conferences.84 The latter, it may be said, was to a certain degree addressed 
towards the local public, as well as professionals. These were accompanied by broad 
information campaigns that comprised publication of specialist periodicals with ample on-line 
and traditional media coverage.   
 
In terms of information tools, we can further mention government communications with several 
sectoral business associations in areas of housing construction and mortgage finance.85 Some of 
these public organisations were formed in the early post-Soviet period, but stepped up their 
activities since the second half of the 2000s. Some of their leading figures - this particularly 
relates to the case of the construction industry groups - had successful careers during the Soviet 
period. Many others have built their careers over the post-Soviet period.  
 
Procedural tools 
With reference to the government’s work with the professional associations, as well as the 
conferences and other public consultations organised by the authorities, we are moving from 
the nodality-based substantive tools towards what I defined earlier on as procedural tools. The 
latter instruments are used by the government to steer the policy process itself and structure 
relations among its diverse societal participants. Among the procedural tools examined below 
the use of authority and organisation is prominent and a bundle of tools involving forms of 
nodality and authority is identified. 
 
The analysis of the work of professional associations in the housing and housing finance 
industry reveals their close cooperation with government departments as well with the 
country’s representative institutions. Many members of their staff worked in leading posts 
within the state bureaucracy or acted in advisory positions or some had been elected members 
                                                          
83 V Kaliningrade nachal rabotu tretiy ‘Forum ZhKKh 2015’, 28 April 2015, 
http://www.minstroyrf.ru/press/forum-zhkkh-2015-nachal-rabotu-v-severo-zapadnom-federalnom-
okruge/ (accessed April 2015). 
84  See: http://2016.mosurbanforum.ru/city/city_2015/ (accessed June 2017). 
85 Among these are the Association of the Construction Industry of Russia (Assotsiatsia stroiteley Rossii, 
www.a-s-r.ru), the Russian Union of the Construction Industry (Rossiyskiy Soyuz Stroiteley, RSS, 
www.omorrss.ru), and the National Union of the Construction Industry (Natsional’noe Ob’’edinenie 
Stroiteley, Nosstroy, www.nostroy.ru), as well as those pertaining to  the mortgage industry, such as the 
Association of Russian regional banks (Assotsiatsia Regional’nykh Bankov Rossii, www.asros.ru) and the 
Association of Russian Banks (Assotsiatsia Rossiyskikh Bankov, www.arb.ru). 
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of parliament. These connections are indicative of the informal inter-personal bonds that exist 
among these actors. However, the efforts towards the institutionalization of these interactions 
were evident. So, in formal terms, the mutual work took the form of expert groups, 
consultations and efforts to create institutions of ‘self-governance’ within the industry.  
 
Self-governance was particularly important within the highly fragmented and localised 
construction industry. The national association Nostroy was the case in point. While this 
structure was originally set up in the early 1990s its activities were encouraged by the 
government in the second half of the 2000s at the time of the adoption of the legislation on self-
regulated organisations (SRO) in 2007-2008, an exercise of government authority.86 
Subsequently, in 2010 a joint Memorandum of Cooperation was signed between the association 
and the sectoral ministry, MinRegion. Currently this umbrella association comprises 274 local 
associations which cover 130,000 large, small and medium construction enterprises (SMEs) 
(see statistics at the association’s website). Only seven percent of these are large businesses, 
whereas the clear majority remaining are SMEs. Working through such corporatist 
arrangements the government sought to increase its outreach within the housing industry at the 
local and regional levels with an objective of promoting its procedural objectives such as 
managing within-the-industry conflicts and gaining access to industrial expertise, while also 
pursuing the substantive objectives of housing construction and standards monitoring. A 
television interview with a prominent expert on Russian housing policy provided an insight into 
how this cooperation might work in practice. She suggested that, even under tough economic 
conditions on which housing construction industry fall starting from 2015, construction firms 
would be strongly urged to fulfil any existing building projects and to avoid filing for 
bankruptcy. To avoid disappointing or even deceiving home-buyers then construction firms 
would be ‘encouraged’ to complete initiated projects even at a loss.87 
 
With the help of the professional associations the government also sought to engage investors, 
experts and academics to promote industry-wide dialogue, exchange of ideas and investment. 
Examples of this trend were the high-profile forums set up in the early 2010s, as mentioned 
above. Among the consultative structures that were created by the Russian executive 
institutions were the President’s Council for Housing Policy and Increasing Housing 
Affordability,88 and the Working Group for the Development of HUS at the Russian government 
                                                          
86 The case in point Federal Law N. 315-FZ adopted on 1 December 2007 ‘O samoreguliruemykh 
organizatsiyakh’, available at http://www.nostroy.ru/legislature/normativno-pravovye_akty/ (accessed 
June 2017). Among its many subsequent amendments Federal Law N 148-FZ from 22 July 2008 
established procedures for self-regulation in construction. See history of Nostroy at 
http://www.nostroy.ru/nostroy/ob_obedinenii/history/ (accessed June 2017).  
87 Telekanal ORT, Prezident Fonda rasskazala v programme “Otrazhenie” telekanala “ORT” ob osnovnykh 
tendentsiyakh stroitel’noy otrasli v strane, 18 September 2015, available at 
http://www.urbaneconomics.ru/publications/?mat_id=2758 and http://www.otr-
online.ru/programmi/tamozhnya-daet-dobro-44391.html (accessed 11 December 2015). 
88 http://kremlin.ru/events/councils/by-council/38/18968 (accessed March 2015), later transformed 
into the Presidential Council for Strategic Planning and Priority Projects, 
http://kremlin.ru/events/councils/by-council/1029/52297 (accessed June 2017).  
19 
 
Expert Council.89 Experts from the professional associations and think tanks participated in 
these and other consultative bodies and produced joint research. For instance, a research 
project conducted by a leading housing think tanks, the Institute for Urban Economics in 
cooperation with Nosstroy in 2011 examined the problem of administrative barriers in 
construction. Although the sources of funding were not mentioned, the objective of the study 
coincided with the president’s aims to improve the investment climate and Russia’s ratings in 
the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ guide.90  
 
In sum, regarding the use of substantive instruments, the Russian government has relied on 
combinations of softer tools of treasure and nodality each underpinned by the use of heavier 
organisational and authority-based instruments. In relation to procedural tools the government 
has relied on the use of all four types - nodality, authority, treasure and organisation - but 
particularly on more invasive types of authority and organisation in implementing its 
procedural tasks. The substantive and procedural tools associated with Russian housing 
development are summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Procedural and Substantive tools in the Russian housing sphere ABOUT HERE 
 
The choice of instruments explained 
Why did the Russian government select this specific instrument mix including substantive and 
procedural elements? As proposed earlier the choice is influenced by two variables: state 
capacity to affect societal and bureaucratic actors and the complexity of the policy community 
concerned. Russian institutional setting involves such features as the weak civil society and 
authoritarian politics undermined by the weakness of formal institutional structures, 
particularly the limited responsiveness of the state administration at the regional and local 
levels to the federal command. The implications of these features for policy-making particularly 
come to light in relation to regional and local levels of policy implementation. The officials at 
these levels remained unaccountable to the public and were driven, as the issue of housing 
repairs demonstrated above, by rent-seeking motives. In this context, the use of tool ‘bundles’ 
by federal policy makers offered a working solution for the promotion of housing development. 
‘Smarter’ design in this setting involved the creation of the complementary arrangements of 
policy tools that maximise supplementary effects of softer and heavier instruments, with 
organisational and authority-based tools allowing nodality and treasure to reach designated 
users bypassing regional administrations, while also providing channels for the latter to benefit. 
 
                                                          
89 http://government.ru/department/270/about/ (accessed June 2017). 
90 Tatiana Polidi and Andrey Tumanov, “Stroitel’stvo: beg s prepiatstviyami”, Moskovskie Novosti 2 April 
2012: 6.  
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As far as policy-sector-specific structural factors were concerned Russian policy makers had to 
take into account the structures and relationships between economic and social actors 
associated with specific issue areas of this wide sector (i.e. construction, banking, maintenance), 
moreover multiplied by the country’s federal structure. With the goals of promoting the 
economic development in the housing sphere policy-makers aimed to influence a vast and 
highly diverse terrain which potentially includes the entire Russian society - or at least those 
families who wish to improve their housing conditions - and a considerable number of private 
firms working in the sector. In this setting, which features high sub-system complexity, the 
predominant reliance on treasure- and authority-based substantive instruments usually applied 
in this context91 seems logical. Yet, to have the capacity to deliver finance to the housing sphere 
the state had to underpin treasure tools by the use of direct organisation in the case of the 
AHML and by authority to ‘appoint’ a number of trusted banks which become the primary 
mortgage lenders. Thus, producing tool bundles of treasure and organisation and of treasure 
and authority respectively. 
 
The need to use organisation in the form of the AHML was necessitated by conditions when the 
mortgage finance market had to be created from scratch during the post-Soviet era. This meant 
that the capacity of the state to implement this policy including knowledge, resources and 
motivation exceeded the capacity of the sub-system’s members, i.e. private banks. In addition, 
the financial market in Russia comprised a far lesser number of participants - 956 banks - 
compared to a greater number of firms, over two hundred thousand, involved in construction 
and maintenance.92 Thus, it was easier for the state to intervene and coordinate with its 
organisational resources the smaller number of actors in the case of the banking community in 
comparison to the construction industry.93 
 
The federal Fond ZhKKh also represented the application of the bundle of treasure and 
organisation, as the delivery of finance to the nationwide community involved in housing 
renovation. Some of the toughest actors to steer towards this task included regional and local 
levels of state administration which otherwise did not share the government’s policy 
aspirations. The introduction in 2012 of a new set of instruments for financing major repairs by 
the contributions of the homeowners meant to replace budget funding of these costly works 
with household payments. Yet, federal policy designers had to ‘appease’ regional bureaucratic 
interests by allowing them to remain in charge of managing collected contributions via regional 
Funds of Housing Renovation. Policy-makers, however, simultaneously introduced a ‘doubling’ 
instrument that allowed HOAs to manage their savings themselves.  The fact that parallel 
                                                          
91 Howlett, “Managing the ‘Hollow State’”. 
92 According to Rosstat 1094 credit institutions were registered in Russia in 2013, out of which 956 were 
active. See: Chislo i structura kreditnykh organizatsiy, Rosstat, Table 22.22, available at 
http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b13_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d4/22-22.htm). Whereas a number of 
construction firms working in Russia in 2012 amounted to 205 075, which included 201 162 firms with a 
number of employees less than 100. See: Chislo deystvuyushchikh stroitel’nykh organizatsiy, Rosstat, 
Table 16.4, available at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b13_13/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d3/16-04.htm (both 
accessed June 2017).  
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arrangements are included – for policy implementation by corrupt officials and by for civil 
society organisations – suggests that policy designers hope that over time less transparent 
forms will be deserted while civic ones become more widespread. This would be an example of 
policy makers manipulating the mechanisms of temporal institutional transformation (this 
specific one would be a ‘drift’ mechanism)94 to achieve their policy goals. 
 
The limitations of the Russian federal government capacity to implement its policy of 
development are most vividly illustrated with the struggle to promote HOAs through the means 
of government authority tools. The target policy audience that policy makers aimed to influence 
in this context was incredibly broad. It includes all those Russians who reside in multi-family 
apartment blocks. Similar to providing housing finance to the public, in order to reach this 
nation-wide audience, the government sought to underpin its legislative capacity by a form of 
organisation. It attempted to use the local and regional governments as its organisational tools. 
Yet, it was precisely these actors - due to their personal enrichment imperatives and in the 
absence of democratic accountability to the electorate - who were uninterested in cooperating 
beyond rhetorical support. Thus, the proliferation of local housing self-organisation, a ‘would-
be’ nodality tool of state policy in this sphere, remained shallow.  
 
In contrast to the general public whom the government struggles to connect to, my survey of the 
procedural tools has demonstrated that heavier tools of authority and organisation are used 
more effectively in relation to the housing community. This indicates that the Russian 
government has actively set out to manage this professional sub-system as well as how much 
this task was eased by the presence of informal networks. By contrast, in absence of HOAs, 
which could be the basis for effective government-citizen dialogue, only lighter touch 
procedural instruments are applied to engage members of the public. Predominantly, the 
government’s nodality is used to provide citizens with general information. As two housing 
scholars argue: ‘In Russia, problems with democracy in general sustain a lack of housing 
democracy’.95 
 
Conclusion 
Unlike many studies of Russian ‘institutions of development’ that consider their effectiveness or 
rent-seeking behaviour associated with their use, this study adopted a different approach. It 
examined all tools applied in the housing sector, where the goal of development has been 
promoted by the Russian federal policy-makers. The analysis of the combinations of tools within 
the housing policy mix reveal complementary arrangements, what I defined ‘bundles’ of tools, as 
well as the use of doubling tools. This pattern, the paper argues, is determined by Russia’s 
institutional characteristics – weak and unreliable formal institutions of state administration, at 
the local levels in particular – and structural factors related to the operation of specific policy 
areas. Such factors, however, do not reflect in policy automatically, but via the policy makers’ 
                                                          
94 Mahoney and Thelen, “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change”. 
95 Shomina and Heywood, “Transformation in Russian Housing”: 319. 
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choices of policy instruments. These actors used combinations of policy instruments in order to 
increase state capacity to promote development and temporal processes of policy change. The 
example of the latter process was the adoption of parallel or doubling policy tools: (1) those 
relying on state administration and incidentally allowing channels for rent-seeking, and (2) 
those relying on active citizens’ participation and control.  
 
Finally, we can comment on the significance of the developmental mix of policy instruments 
adjusted to the Russian institutional environment in generating public support for the 
government. This support occurs in two ways. The first one relates to the capacity of the state to 
deliver policy outcomes valued by its citizens,96 in this case the satisfaction of their housing 
needs. In addition to the performance-legitimising policy results, the procedural tools aimed at 
achieving ‘embeddedness’ of development – to refer to the poignant term coined by Peter 
Evans97 – play a role in binding professional and expert communities to the process of policy 
implementation and to the state. This is different in relation to the wider public. Even though 
the public enjoy higher living standards, the ‘embedded autonomy’ is the least developed in 
relation to them. Some effort has been put into forming the linkages that would connect the 
public with the powers - as demonstrated by the example of the initiatives sponsored by the 
Moscow city administration. Such ‘participatory’ forms of governance have recently become 
increasingly popular with modern ‘consultative’ authoritarian regimes.98 These forms, however, 
by and large failed to impress urban and educated Muscovites. Yet, associations of homeowners, 
basic structures of housing self-organisation with a potential for becoming nodal tools of 
government with respect to the public, are poorly realised. It is hardly surprising then that in 
Russia the issue area of housing and territorial development, more broadly, has produced 
possibly the greatest number of conflicts between citizens and local authorities over recent 
years. Some of these seemingly local disputes, such as Rechnik housing cooperative, the conflict 
over Khimki forest99 and the on-going at the time of writing conflict surrounding housing 
renovation programme in Moscow,100 have spilled over into issues of federal and even 
international significance. By contrast, conflicts within the construction industry are virtually 
unknown, because of it being more carefully managed and more actively engaged with over the 
recent period. 
 
 
                                                          
96 Nikolai Petrov, Maria Lipman and Henry Hale, “Three Dilemmas of Hybrid Regime Governance: Russia 
from Putin to Putin”, Post-Soviet Affairs 30, no. 1 (2014): 1-26. 
97 Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). 
98 For discussion, see: Rory Truex, “Consultative Authoritarianism and its Limits”, Comparative Political 
Studies 50, no. 3 (2017): 329-361. Truex argues that it is less educated citizens with little experience of 
being involved in decision-making that tend to be impressed by the participatory mechanisms introduced 
by authoritarian states.  
99 Evans, “Protests and Civil Society in Russia”. 
100 Max Seddon, “Moscow plan to raze Khrushchev-era flats sparks tenants’ anger”, Financial Times, 13 
May 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/129525f0-3655-11e7-99bd-13beb0903fa3 (accessed May 
2017).  
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Table 1: Russian housing and mortgage market development, 2005-2014 
 
 
 
Indicator/ Period 
 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
Volume of Mortgage 
lending,  
RUB Million 
 
- 263 561 556 399 655 808 152 500 376 331 716 944 1 031 992 1 353 926 1 764 126 
 
Average floor space of 
new built housing per 
capita, Square meters 
per person 
 
0,31 0,35 0,42 0,45 0,42 0,41 0,44 0,45 0,49 0,56 
 
Aggregate floor space of 
new housing built, 
Thousand square 
meters 
43 609 50 174 60 350 63 690 59 830 58 114 62 264 65 220 70 485 81 856 
 
Mortgage debt to GDP, 
% 
 
0,2 0,9 1,8 2,7 2,6 2,5 2,7 3,2 4,0 5,0 
 
Average income per 
capita, RUB 
 
7 826 9 817 12 427 14 934 17 008 18 717 20 713 22 719 25 957 27 749 
 
Sources of data: AHML, Rosstat and Bank of Russia 
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TABLE 2: Procedural and substantive tools in the Russian housing sphere 
Nodality Treasure Authority    Organisation 
Substantive tools    
For the Public: 
Info on  
- mortgages 
-state programmes  
TSZhs, - shallow 
proliferation 
AHML (T+O) 
Fond RZhS (T+O) 
Fond ZhKKh (T+O) 
State Banks (T+A) 
for 
-  mortgages  
 -infrastructural 
projects 
Housing code 
Other housing and housing 
industry-related legislation  
 
State  banks (T+A) 
   AHML (T+O) 
   Fond RZhS (T+O) 
   Fond ZhKKh (T+O) 
   Regional Funds for major 
repairs 
 
Procedural tools 
For Industry and 
experts: 
Communication/policy 
involvement: 
- business associations 
(N+A) 
- expert groups 
 
For the Public (rare): 
- Focus groups 
- Online initiatives 
Funding research Setting up/encouraging 
business associations (N+A) 
Agreements on cooperation 
between executive 
departments and business 
associations 
Advisory groups attached to 
different executive 
departments 
   Ministerial reforms 
   
   Forums and conferences: 
- Urban forum 
- Construction forum 
- HUS Forum 
 
(T+O) - Treasure and Organisation bundle 
(T+A) - Treasure and Authority bundle 
(N+A) - Nodality and Authority bundle 
